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INTRODUCTION 
No jury has ever heard all the facts in this case including its most shameful 
aspect: doctors and lawyers conspired to conceal medical negligence and to deprive 
Shelly Hipwell, a brain-damaged coma patient, of legal representation and compensation 
for her catastrophic injuries. 
The Trial Court has consistently refused to permit Plaintiffs to present any 
evidence of fraudulent concealment, even in the bifurcated 1999 statute of limitations 
trial where the admissibility of concealment was obvious. In 2000, the trial court 
dismissed Plaintiffs' fraud claims with no evidentiary hearing. 
At the 2001 medical negligence trial, the trial court refused to allow both 
evidence of concealment and the opinion of the Plaintiffs' expert on the key negligence 
components of Plaintiffs' case (and instructed the jury that Defendant IHC was not 
negligent). 
In the 2001 trial, the jury should have been permitted to hear about the 
conspiracy that Dr. Healy orchestrated on his own behalf and on behalf of IHC and which 
IHC joined to conceal the medical malpractice of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. The jury 
also should have been permitted to hear the opinion of Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. DeVore, that 
McKay-Dee's emergency room was clearly negligent in failing to immediately refer 
Shelly to an obstetrician (instead merely sending her home with Tylenol when she was 
obviously suffering from severe preeclampsia). 
The Hipwells are entirely willing to live with the verdict of a jury that is 
permitted to hear their entire case. After all these many years, the Hipwells should 
finally be permitted to present their entire case to the jury and let the jury decide whether 
Shelly died as a result of negligence of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE FRAUD 
CLAIMS. 
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1. The Jensen Court Did Not Dismiss the Hipwells' Fraud Claims, 
Dr. Healy insists that in Jensen v. IHC Hospitals. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1997), the Hipwells' fraud claims were dismissed because the Jensen court supposedly 
found that the Hipwells only had a claim for medical malpractice that was fraudulently 
concealed, and did not have an independent fraud claim. This argument fundamentally 
misconstrues and ignores important language and the basic rationale of the Jensen 
decision. 
The issue that the Jensen court faced was whether the three-year common law 
fraud statute of limitations or the two-year Medical Malpractice Act statute of limitations 
governed the Hipwells' fraud claims. The Jensen court recognized that both of these 
statutes applied on their face to the Hipwells' fraud claims. The Jensen court stated that 
the medical malpractice statute of limitations and its fraudulent concealment doctrine 
"applies to every 'malpractice action against a health care provider'" and applied the 
"settled rule of statutory construction" that "a more specific statute governs instead of a 
more general statute." [944 P.2d at 336] The court opined: 
Thus, the Medical Malpractice Act's two-year statute of limitations 
applies to cases of fraudulent concealment arising out of medical 
malpractice. 
In contrast, the three-year fraud statute of limitations, §78-12-
26, applies to any action "for relief on the ground of fraud." The 
fraud statute of limitations is thus far broader than the Medical 
Malpractice Act, and our rules of statutory construction provide 
that the more specific medical malpractice applies instead of the 
more general fraud statute of limitations. [Id.] 
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If the Hipwells had no independent fraud claims, the common law fraud statute of 
limitations could not have applied to their claims and the court's analysis would have 
been unnecessary. 
Dr. Healy mistakenly relies upon the following language to support his 
interpretation of Jensen: 
While we acknowledge that there may be cases where a doctor 
commits fraud on a patient in a way that would not be covered by 
the Medical Malpractice Act's fraudulent concealment provision, 
this is not such a case. Given the specific facts alleged in this case, 
we cannot agree that Shelly's family's fraud claim amounts to 
anything more than or is different from a claim of fraudulent 
concealment of medical malpractice. 
This language does not at all support Dr. Healy's position. All the Jensen 
court was saying in this passage is that because the fraud claims made by the Hipwells 
were for fraudulent concealment of medical malpractice they were governed by the more 
specific Medical Malpractice Act statute of limitations rather than the general common 
law fraud statute of limitations. If the Jensen court had been of the opinion that the 
Hipwells had no common law claim for fraudulent concealment, the court certainly 
would have said so and would have ruled that the three-year common law fraud statute of 
limitations did not apply because no common law fraud claim existed. The court would 
not have bothered to decide which fraud statute of limitations should be applied. 
Instead of rejecting the common law fraud claims, the Jensen court 
specifically ruled that those common law fraud claims were governed by the two-year 
medical malpractice statute of limitations: 
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Finally, we hold that Shelly's family's claims for common law 
fraud are also governed by the two-year medical malpractice 
statute of limitations found in §78-14-4 [944 P.2d at 337] 
If the Hipwells had no common law fraud claims, it would have been nonsensical for the 
Jensen court to rule that nonexistent claims were governed by the two-year statute of 
limitations. 
Dr. Healy also points to some dicta contained in the first paragraph of the 
Jensen court's opinion on the petition for rehearing in which Justice Zimmerman was 
very cursorily "setting the table" to discuss the issues raised on rehearing: 
We further held that Jensen and Hipwell's attempt to 
recharacterize their medical malpractice wrongful death claim as a 
claim for fraud was not sufficient to avoid the two-year medical 
malpractice statute of limitations. [944 P.2d at 337] 
Notably, Justice Zimmerman did not state in this passage that the court had 
dismissed the fraud claims. Apparently, all Justice Zimmerman meant by this language 
was that the court had determined that the Hipwells' assertion of fraud was not sufficient 
to avoid the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations for the reason stated in 
the original opinion, i.e., that a cause of action for fraudulent concealment of medical 
malpractice is governed by the two-year statute rather than the three-year common law 
fraud statute. In any event, this rather cryptic dicta cannot overcome the clear rationale 
and language of the original opinion which clearly recognized the existence of the 
Hipwells' fraud claims and determined they were governed by the two-year statute of 
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limitations. The rehearing opinion did not purport to revisit or modify the original 
opinion in this regard. 
2. The Hipwells Were Damaged by the Fraudulent Concealment 
Dr. Healy also incorrectly asserts that the Hipwells could not have suffered 
any damages as a result of the fraudulent concealment because the concealment was 
discovered and there is no cause of action for attempted fraud. This argument ignores 
Hipwells' evidence. 
First, the Hipwells were damaged because part of the fraudulent concealment 
was the dumping of Shelly by transferring her to the University Hospital on the pretext 
that she may have necrotizing fasciitis. The conduct of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee in 
dumping Shelly on the University Hospital put her in harms way. But for that dumping, 
Shelly's heart would not have been punctured by the resident physician at the University 
Hospital. Dr. Healy and IHC are liable for all of the harm caused by their negligence and 
fraudulent concealment. See, e.g., Holden v. Balko, 949 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ind. 1996); 
Carmichael v. Bellen 914 P.2d 1051, 1057 (Okla. 1996). 
Second, as a result of the fraudulent concealment, the Hipwells were required 
to litigate the statute of limitations issue with Dr. Healy and IHC for several years, 
including engaging in substantial discovery, defending a summary judgment motion, 
prosecuting a successful appeal on the statute of limitations issue and finally bearing the 
cost and expense of a separate trial on the statute of limitations at which the Hipwells 
prevailed. A jury could well find that had Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee not acted to 
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fraudulently conceal their malpractice, the Hipwells would have filed their claims well 
before the statute of limitations expired and would not have had to litigate for several 
years the issues of when the malpractice was, or should have been, discovered that were 
infused into the case because of the fraudulent concealment. 
3. The Fraud Claims Are Not Moot 
Dr. Healy and IHC next contend that the fraud claims are now moot because 
the jury has rendered a verdict that the Defendants were not negligent. The problem with 
this argument is fundamental. The jury reached its decision without having the benefit of 
all of the evidence bearing on negligence. 
First, the jury was not permitted to hear evidence concerning the negligence of 
McKay-Dee's emergency room which, as explained at length in Appellants' Brief and 
below, not only prevented the Hipwells from having the jury determine the negligence of 
the emergency room, but could very well have impacted the jury's determination with 
respect to the other negligence claims that the jury was permitted to consider. 
Second, the jury was not permitted to hear the evidence concerning the 
fraudulent concealment of the negligence of Dr. Healy and IHC. This evidence could 
have had a very substantial impact on the jury's opinion of the credibility of Dr. Healy 
and Dr. Baughman when they testified they believed their care of Shelly had been 
perfectly proper and when Dr. Healy testified he had no knowledge of Shelly's treatment 
in the emergency room. 
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The Hipwells should be permitted to present to the jury all of the evidence of 
medical malpractice and fraudulent concealment and then have the jury determine those 
claims. Because the case should be remanded for a new trial on the negligence claims, 
the fraudulent concealment of the alleged negligence is not moot. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING HIPWELLS LEAVE 
TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT, 
The only argument asserted by Dr. Healy and IHC to justify the district 
court's refusal to allow the Hipwells to file their Fourth Amended Complaint to allege a 
privity or agency relationship between Dr. Healy and IHC is that amendment would have 
been futile because the Jensen court had already dismissed the fraud claims. As 
demonstrated above, Jensen did not dismiss the fraud claims, but instead confirmed the 
existence of those claims. Thus, it was clear error for the district court to deny leave to 
amend where the motion to amend was timely made prior to the deadline set by the 
district court for amending pleadings and Dr. Healy and IHC neither alleged nor 
established any prejudice. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
EVIDENCE OF FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF THE MEDICAL 
NEGLIGENCE OF DR. HEALY AND IHC, 
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Dr. Healy's argument that the district court properly excluded evidence of 
fraudulent concealment of the alleged medical malpractice is a study in contrast. On the 
one hand, Dr. Healy ignores important evidence, isolates each piece of remaining 
evidence and gives that evidence the most innocent interpretation possible, and argues 
that by no stretch of the imagination could the evidence demonstrate Dr. Healy engaged 
in a coverup.1 On the other hand, Dr. Healy justifies the exclusion of this evidence under 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence on the ground that the evidence would have been 
extremely prejudicial and would have confused and misled the jury. 
However, it was for the jury to determine what weight to give to the coverup 
evidence and what inferences to draw from that evidence. If the jury agreed with Dr. 
Healy that this evidence was innocuous, the evidence could not have prejudiced Dr. 
Healy and IHC or confused or misled the jury. On the other hand, if the jury agreed with 
the Hipwells that the evidence demonstrated a concerted effort by Dr. Healy and IHC to 
cover up the alleged medical malpractice, then the evidence was highly relevant to show 
an awareness on their part that malpractice had been committed despite their protestations 
to the contrary. 
1
 For example, Dr. Healy argues it was "entirely natural and innocent" for him to discuss 
the tragic events with his attorney brother. [Dr. Healy Brief, pp. 32-32] That is an inference Dr. 
Healy was free to argue to the jury. However, the jury could also have inferred from the timing 
and content of that conversation and the fact that Attorney Healy became secretly involved in the 
representation of Shelly, that this dinner meeting was the beginning of Dr. Healy's effort to 
conceal. 
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It is improper to view each piece of fraudulent conduct evidence in isolation. 
The evidence must be viewed as a whole in determining whether a jury could reasonably 
have concluded that Dr. Healy and IHC fraudulently concealed the alleged negligence. 
Shelly went to the emergency room at McKay-Dee early in the morning of 
December 12, 1988, complaining of severe pains that she had been experiencing for 
several hours. According to the Hipwells' expert, Dr. Gregory DeVore, ("Dr. DeVore"), 
Shelly was suffering from severe preeclampsia at the time and the emergency room 
should have immediately referred her to an obstetrician for appropriate treatment and 
immediate delivery of her baby rather than sending her home with Tylenol. When Dr. 
DeVore was consulted on December 13, he immediately sent Shelly to labor and 
delivery. It was Dr. DeVore's opinion that had Shelly been delivered earlier, the severe 
complications that she suffered could have been avoided. 
After delivery, Shelly suffered serious complications on December 14, but Dr. 
Healy and McKay-Dee allowed her to bleed internally for hours before finally obtaining 
a surgical consultation from Dr. Alder who quickly diagnosed a probable ruptured liver 
and performed immediate surgery by which time Shelly had lost approximately 60% of 
her blood volume into her distended abdomen. [See Appellants' Brief, SOF Nos. 1-9] 
Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman then caused Shelly to be transferred to the 
University Hospital on the pretext that she may have necrotizing fasciitis even though 
either McKay-Dee or L.D.S. Hospital could have treated that condition and even though 
Dr. Alder had opined - - and the tests proved - - that Shelly did not have the lethal form 
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of necrotizing fasciitis about which the doctors were allegedly concerned. In fact, the day 
Shelly arrived at the University Hospital it was determined she did not have that 
condition. Despite this fact, Dr. Healy and IHC made no attempt to return Shelly to the 
IHC system. [Appellants' Brief, SOF Nos. 14-15] 
When Shelly's heart was punctured at the University Hospital, Dr. Healy 
recognized he was a potential Defendant in her negligence claim and within two days met 
with his brother, Attorney Healy, and discussed Shelly's medical negligence case with 
him in depth. Shortly thereafter, Attorney Healy discussed the matter with the Healys' 
sister, Diane Devries ("Devries"), who was Dr. Healy's file clerk and the Relief Society 
President in the Hipwells' L.D.S. ward. As a result of this contact, Roger Sharp was 
retained to represent the Hipwells and Attorney Healy was secretly associated as co-
counsel to receive 40% of the fee. 
Shortly thereafter, Attorney Healy wrote his February 13, 1989 letter to Roger 
Sharp essentially confirming that there would be no real investigation of Dr. Healy's care 
of Shelly and that the claim should be settled without litigation. When Sharp then asked 
for Dr. Healy's file, Attorney Healy assured him the request was routine and Dr. Healy 
withheld significant portions of the file. 
Finally, in order to facilitate a quick settlement without the necessity of 
litigation, Dr. Healy opined to his brother that Shelly would probably die very soon, 
knowing that this information would be used by the lawyers as an excuse to settle 
Shelly's case quickly and cheaply. 
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A jury could reasonably conclude from this evidence that Dr. Healy conspired 
with his brother, Attorney Healy, and his sister, Devries, and Sharp to have Sharp and 
Attorney Healy retained to represent the Hipwells so there would be no real investigation 
of Dr. Healy's care of Shelly, and to avoid extensive litigation in which that care may 
come under close scrutiny. A jury could reasonably conclude that Dr. Healy was acting 
as an agent of or was in privity with IHC in orchestrating the coverup and that IHC joined 
the concealment effort when Shelly was transferred to the University Hospital on a 
pretext to avoid discovery of McKay-Dee's emergency room negligence and the 
negligence in allowing Shelly to bleed internally for several hours before repairing her 
ruptured liver. 
The Hipwells are entitled to have their entire case presented to the jury and 
then let the jury determine whether Dr. Healy and IHC were negligent and whether they 
are guilty of fraudulent concealment. By excluding the fraudulent concealment evidence, 
the district court improperly amputated an important part of the Hipwells' case and 
prevented the jury from fully considering the merits of this case. 
Dr. Healy argues that this coverup evidence would only be admissible if it was 
"clear and unequivocally inconsistent with innocence." [Dr. Healy Brief, p. 32] Dr. 
Healy is unable to cite any case that supports that strict standard. To the contrary, if the 
jury could reasonably infer that the conduct of Dr. Healy and IHC demonstrated an 
awareness that they had negligently treated Shelly, that is all that is required to make this 
evidence relevant. It is for a jury to weigh and determine the meaning of conflicting 
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evidence. Alternative explanations for conduct alleged to show an awareness of guilt "go 
to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence." State v. Hokate, 10 P.3d 
346, 353-354 (Utah 2000); Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Alas. 1983); People v. 
Perry, 499 P.2d 129, 139 (Cal. 1972). 
The Hipwells were entitled to prove a conspiracy through circumstantial 
evidence and the existence of a tacit understanding on the object to be accomplished, 
based upon the conduct of those participating in the conspiracy and their interests. Thus, 
in Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 791 (Utah App. 1987), the court 
observed: 
There is no direct evidence in the record of a meeting of the 
parties' minds with respect to defrauding Pagan of his property. 
However, it is not necessary in a civil conspiracy action to prove 
that the parties actually came together and entered into a formal 
agreement to do the acts complained of by direct evidence. 
Instead, conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, 
including the nature of the act done, the relations of the parties and 
the interests of the alleged conspirators. To prove conspiracy to 
defraud by circumstantial evidence, though, "there must be 
substantial proof of circumstances from which it reasonably 
follows, or at least may be reasonably inferred, that the conspiracy 
existed. It cannot be established by conjecture and speculation 
alone." [Citations Omitted] 
See also. Holmes v. McKay, 383 P.2d 655, 665 (Okla. 1963); Chicago Title Insurance 
Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp., 44 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal. 1968). 
Dr. Healy argues that before statements made by one Defendant against 
another may be admitted under the co-conspirator exception the Hipwells were required 
to prove the existence of the conspiracy by independent proof and by a preponderance of 
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the evidence. Dr. Healy argues that the Hipwells failed to do so and the trial court never 
determined the existence of a conspiracy. Of course, the short answer to this argument is 
that the Hipwells attempted to prove the conspiracy, and the evidence set forth above is 
certainly sufficient from which a jury could have determined a conspiracy existed, but the 
trial court at the urging of Dr. Healy and IHC would not permit the jury to hear the 
conspiracy evidence.2 
Although Dr. Healy insists that the conduct of Dr. Healy and IHC was 
innocent, he further argues that the district court was justified in excluding that evidence 
because of possible prejudice and confusion of the issues under Rule 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
Understandably, neither the district court nor Dr. Healy have been able to 
particularize what unfair prejudice this evidence may have engendered. If the evidence 
was innocuous, as Dr. Healy and IHC proclaim, then the evidence would not have been 
prejudicial at all. On the other hand, if the jury agreed with the Hipwells that this 
evidence demonstrated an awareness that negligence had been committed, the evidence 
would have been highly relevant to whether Dr. Healy and IHC had committed 
malpractice. Although in that event the evidence would have been prejudicial in the 
sense that it would have hurt Dr. Healy and IHCs case, the evidence would not have 
2
 Dr. Healy erroneously argues that the conspiracy was not presented to the court below 
and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This is incorrect. The conspiracy was raised as 
early as the Hipwells' Second Amended Complaint filed in 1993 and in opposition to Defendants' 
summary judgment motion in 1994. [See, e^ g., R. 264-265; 905-907] 
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been unfairly prejudicial. There is no basis for any argument that the evidence may have 
led the jury to decide the negligence issue on an improper basis, which is what is required 
to show unfair prejudice. In order for the district court to properly exclude the 
concealment evidence on the ground of prejudice, Dr. Healy and IHC were required to 
show that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of 
the evidence. See, e ^ , United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001). They 
failed to do so.3 The district court, therefore, abused its discretion in excluding this 
evidence. See, e ^ , State v. Mitchell 571 P.2d 1351, 1354 (Utah 1997). 
Dr. Healy also mistakenly suggests that the Hipwells have waived any right to 
challenge the district court's exclusion of the fraudulent concealment evidence on 
relevancy grounds under Rule 402. [Dr. Healy Brief, p. 37] The district court in fact 
grounded its decision on Rule 403. [R. 508 at 1257-59] However, it is disingenuous to 
suggest that the Hipwells failed to argue that this fraudulent concealment evidence was 
relevant. The entire thrust of the Hipwells' argument in Appellants' Brief was that this 
evidence was highly relevant and there was no unfair prejudice that substantially 
outweighed the probative value of the evidence. [See Appellants' Brief, pp. 38-43] 
3
 Dr. Healy tells the court that the coverup could not have been proven without witnesses 
that the Hipwells did not name on their witness list - - Attorney Healy, Sharp and Devries. This 
argument is surprising given the fact that these witnesses were in fact on the Hipwells' witness list 
[R 2944-2945] and Dr. Healy and IHC moved to exclude them as witnesses on the basis that no 
evidence of the fraudulent concealment could be presented. [R. 3265-3267] 
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Dr. Healy next argues that the Hipwells have waived any right to challenge the 
district court's conclusion that the evidence would cause confusion to the jury. [Dr. Healy 
Brief, p. 37] However, the Hipwells expressly argued that it was improper for the district 
court to exclude the evidence under Rule 403, which includes exclusion on the basis of 
confusion of the issues. The fact that the Hipwells refer generically in their brief to 
"unfair prejudice" rather than separately referring to "confusion of the issues" does not 
constitute a waiver of this argument. 
Again, neither the district court nor Dr. Healy and IHC have been able to 
explain how this evidence could confuse the issues other than Dr. Healy's conclusory 
insistence that "the Hipwells hoped to confuse the medical issues with far-fetched and 
attenuated allegations of concealment." [Dr. Healy Brief, p. 38] Evidence that Dr. Healy 
and IHC acted to cover up their negligence would hardly confuse the issue of whether 
they were guilty of negligence. Of course, the court's jury instructions would have 
instructed the jury to the effect that they were to consider this evidence solely on the 
issue of whether it demonstrated Dr. Healy and/or IHC had a consciousness that they 
were guilty of negligence (because the court had wrongly dismissed the fraud claims). 
Finally, Dr. Healy argues that the district court correctly excluded this 
evidence because evidence of Dr. Healy's conduct could have unfairly prejudiced or 
confused the jury with respect to IHC. That is no more true than in any case where 
multiple defendants are involved and evidence of one defendant's conduct does not 
necessarily implicate another defendant. If the evidence only demonstrated that Dr. 
16 
Healy fraudulently concealed the alleged negligence (which the Hipwells dispute), then 
an appropriate limiting instruction could have been given and IHC was free to argue that 
to the jury. On the other hand, the jury could well have believed Dr. Healy was acting as 
the agent of or in privity with IHC and that IHC joined in the fraudulent concealment 
when it transferred Shelly to the University of Utah Hospital on a pretext. 
In any event, any danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues 
certainly did not substantially outweigh the probativeness of this evidence. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN EXCLUDING 
PR, DEVORE'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE EMERGENCY ROOM 
NEGLIGENCE, 
Dr. Healy and IHC contend in their briefs that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in excluding Dr. DeVore's testimony concerning the emergency room 
negligence because Dr. DeVore was not an emergency room physician, had not practiced 
in the emergency room for more than twenty years when the specialty of emergency room 
physician did not exist, that he subscribed to no literature and took no courses in 
emergency medicine, and had no knowledge concerning guidelines for liver function tests 
at the McKay-Dee emergency room.4 What Dr. Healy and IHC fail to address is the 
4
 IHC cites Franklin v. The Public Health Trust, 759 So.2d 703, 705 (Fla. App. 2000), for 
the holding that a physician was not qualified to testify concerning emergency room negligence 
where he had not provided emergency room services in a hospital emergency room within the 
preceding five years. However, this holding was based on a specific Florida statute requiring such 
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qualifications which Dr. DeVore did undeniably possess and which qualified him to 
testify as an expert on the emergency room standard of care in this case. 
Dr. DeVore specialized in maternal fetal medicine and high risk pregnancies. 
Preeclampsia and HELP syndrome are complications of high risk pregnancy and can only 
be suffered by pregnant women. Dr. DeVore testified that he was fully familiar with 
emergency room procedures in the various hospitals at which he had worked with respect 
to the handling and treatment of obstetric patients. Dr. DeVore testified that the standard 
of care was uniform in the hospitals at which he had worked and that he was familiar 
with the standard of care for emergency room care of a third trimester obstetrical patient 
such as Shelly. Most importantly. Dr. DeVore testified without contradiction that he was 
aware of IHC's policies and procedures with respect to such obstetrical patients during 
December of 1988. Dr. DeVore was the Director of Maternal Fetal Medicine for IHC at 
the time. In fact Dr. DeVore trained IHC physicians at the IHC hospital emergency 
rooms as to the standard of care when a third trimester obstetric patient with Shelly's 
symptoms presented to the emergency room. 
Dr. DeVore was fully competent to testify that an emergency room physician 
was not qualified to treat Shelly's symptoms and that the standard of care required that 
the emergency room physician immediately consult with an obstetrician and have the 
obstetrician treat Shelly. [R. 5004 at pp. 276-281; R. 288-301 and 416-441] Because the 
experience before admitting expert testimony. The case is, therefore, not on point. 
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standard of care required the emergency room physician to immediately refer Shelly to an 
obstetrician for treatment, Dr. DeVore was fully qualified to testify that the standard of 
care was breached. 
In Appellants' Brief, the Hipwells argued that Judge Iwasaki had ruled prior to 
the trial that Dr. DeVore could testify as to the breach of the standard of care by the 
emergency room physician, but then reversed his decision at trial. IHC argues that this 
claim is "disingenuous" because prior to trial the district court had ruled that absent 
further foundation Dr. DeVore could not testify concerning Shelly's treatment in the 
emergency room "during triage stages, specifically, prior to her being diagnosed as 
needing obstetric care." [IHC Brief, p. 24] 
This argument is misleading because all Judge Iwasaki precluded by this 
ruling was testimony concerning general emergency room procedures prior to the time 
that Shelly was diagnosed as needing obstetric care. When Shelly appeared in the 
emergency room in the third trimester of her pregnancy with severe abdominal pains, the 
standard of care required that she be immediately referred to an obstetrician. It is that 
testimony that was allowed under Judge Iwasaki's original ruling and then excluded when 
Judge Iwasaki changed his mind during trial. 
IHC argues that Dr. DeVore had no business attempting to testify that an 
emergency room physician should have been able to diagnose Shelly's rare condition and 
refer her to an obstetrician. [IHC Brief, p. 27] 
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This argument ignores the fact that the standard of care required that the 
emergency room physician not attempt to diagnose Shelly, but instead to immediately 
refer her to an obstetrician for specific diagnosis and treatment. 
IHC also argues that the Hipwells "have failed to show that admission of Dr. 
DeVore's emergency testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial." [IHC 
Brief, p. 28] IHC argues that the emergency room physician conducted extensive testing 
and found no indication of significant disease and did direct Shelly to follow up with her 
physician the next day and that there was evidence that delivery one day sooner would 
not have affected Shelly's outcome. 
However, all the Hipwells are required to show to prove harmful error is that 
absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the 
Hipwells. See, State v. Dunn. 350 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993). IHC's argument 
ignores Dr. DeVore's testimony that the standard of care required that Shelly be delivered 
at the time of the emergency room visit on December 12 or that morning because her 
symptoms were hallmarks for severe preeclampsia and that Shelly's severe complications 
could have been avoided had she been delivered timely. [R5004 at 422-423 and 444-447] 
If the jury been given the rest of the story, and if Dr. DeVore's testimony had 
been admitted, there was certainly a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have ruled 
in favor of the Hipwells on their emergency room negligence claim and the other 
negligence claims. 
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IHC further argues that even if it had been proven that the emergency room 
physician was negligent, the Hipwells failed to prove that the physician was an agent of 
the hospital and therefore his negligence would not have resulted in any liability to the 
hospital. 
However, courts throughout the country have held hospitals liable for the 
negligence of the emergency room physicians they employ even if those physicians are 
independent contractors. Numerous courts have held hospitals vicariously liable under 
either ostensible or apparent agency or agency by estoppel theories. See, e.g.. 
Pourbianskv v. Emery University. 275 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. App. 1981): Paintsville Hospital 
v. Rose. 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ken. 1985); Mehlman v. Powell. 378 A.2d 1121 (Mary. 1977); 
Seneris v. Haas. 291 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1955). 
For example, in Paintsville Hospital, supra, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
reversed summary judgment in favor of the hospital for the negligence of an emergency 
room physician on the basis of an ostensible agency theory, observing: 
The landmark case applying the principle of ostensible agency 
to physicians not employed by the hospital but furnished through 
the institutional processes is Seneris v. Haas . . . , where it was 
applied to an anesthesiologist. Since then, few courts have failed 
to recognize the soundness of this application, and the concept has 
been generally applied not only to anesthesiologists, but to 
pathologists, radiologists, and emergency room physicians, all of 
whom share the common characteristic of being supplied through 
the hospital rather than being selected by the patient . . . . 
As stated by the Superior Court of New Jersey in discussing the 
public's reasonable expectation of emergency room physicians . . . : 
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"People who seek medical help through the emergency room 
facilities of modern-day hospitals are unaware of the status of the 
various professionals working there." 
In these circumstances it is unreasonable to put a duty on the 
patient to inquire of each person who treats him whether he is an 
employer or independent contractor of the hospital. Indeed, it 
would be astonishing for courts to require a patient to ask the 
emergency room personnel such a question considering the usual 
circumstances of the patient at the time he seeks out the emergency 
room for treatment. 
"Absent notice to the contrary, therefore, plaintiff had the right to 
assume that the treatment received was being rendered through 
hospital employees and that any negligence associated with that 
treatment would render the hospital responsible." [683 S.W.2d at 
256-258] [Citations Omitted] 
Other courts have held the hospitals liable on the basis they have a non-
delegible duty to provide emergency room service. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power. 743 P.2d 
1376 (Alas. 1987); Irving v. Doctors Hospital. 415 So.2d 55 (Fla. App. 1982); Martell v. 
St. Charles Hospital. 523 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1987); Simmons v. Tuomev Regional Medical 
Center. 533 S.E.2d 312 (S.Car. 2000). But see. Babtist Memorial Hospital v. Sampson. 
969 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1998); Kelly v. St. Luke Hospital. 826 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. App. 
1992). 
Finally, Dr. Healy argues that even if the emergency room was negligent that 
would not affect the verdict in his favor because Dr. Healy was not made aware of the 
emergency room visit and did not play a role in the emergency room treatment. This 
argument should be rejected for two reasons. 
First, as argued in Appellants' Brief, the district court's dismissal of the 
emergency room malpractice claim and instruction to the jury that the emergency room 
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was not negligence could well have affected their determination that Dr. Healy was not 
negligent in his subsequent treatment of Shelly. The jury could have believed that the 
emergency room negligence was more egregious than anything that Dr. Healy did or 
failed to do, and therefore if the emergency room was not negligent, neither was Dr. 
Healy. 
Second the district court improperly excluded the fraudulent concealment 
evidence. If the jury had been permitted to hear that evidence, the jury may well have 
found not credible Dr. Healy's testimony that he was not notified of the emergency room 
visit and found that given his knowledge of that visit it was negligent for him not to 
immediately deliver Shelly.5 
The Hipwells should be permitted to present Dr. DeVore's entire testimony 
concerning the emergency room negligence to the jury and then let the jury decide 
whether the emergency room was negligent. 
E. THE HIPWELLS HAVE MET THEIR BURDEN OF 
DEMONSTRATING HARMFUL ERROR. 
Dr. Healy wrongly argues that the Hipwells have failed to meet their burden 
of showing that the errors committed by the district court were harmful because the jury 
5
 In this regard, the emergency room physician made a note to follow up with Dr. Healy 
"F/U Dr. Healy". [R. 5004 at pp. 405-406] The jury may have concluded that the emergency 
room did follow up with Dr. Healy, but he failed to take appropriate action. 
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would have reached the same result even if the fraudulent concealment evidence and Dr. 
DeVore's testimony had been admitted. This contention is, of course, pure speculation. 
As stated earlier, all the Hipwells are required to demonstrate is "absent the error there is 
a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to" the Hipwells. State v. Dunn. 
supra. 
To attempt to convince the court that the errors were not harmful, Dr. Healy 
recites the evidence favorable to his position and ignores the fraudulent concealment 
evidence and Dr. DeVore's testimony. It is hardly fair to argue that the result would have 
been the same without fairly discussing the evidence the jury would have had before it to 
support the Hipwells' case. 
In this regard, Dr. Healy and IHC repeatedly attempt to denigrate Dr. 
DeVore's credentials and expertise while arguing that all the Hipwells had was Dr. 
DeVore versus all of their supposed "nationally renowned" experts as if the battle goes to 
the side which has the most money to parade the most experts into court. Fortunately, 
that is not the case because a medical malpractice plaintiff can rarely match the vast 
resources and contacts of the hospitals, the physicians and their insurance companies. 
The denigration of Dr. DeVore is also strategic. Certainly IHC thought highly 
enough of Dr. DeVore to make him Corporate Director of Maternal Fetal Medicine for 
high risk obstetrics responsible for supervising the obstetrical operations of IHC and to 
have him travel throughout the IHC system training its emergency room physicians and 
staff on the care of third trimester obstetric patients such as Shelly. Dr. Healy also 
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thought highly enough of Dr. DeVore to refer Shelly to him when complications arose in 
her pregnancy. 
If the jury knew that Dr. Healy and IHC fraudulently concealed their 
negligence and had been permitted to hear Dr. DeVore's full testimony concerning 
Shelly's care in the emergency room and his opinion that the emergency room breached 
the standard of care in its treatment of Shelly, there is certainly a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury would have found in the Hipwells' favor.6 
With respect to the specific issues on which Dr. Healy claims the jury could 
not reasonably have found in the Hipwells' favor even had all the evidence been before it, 
Dr. DeVore's testimony was an ample basis upon which the jury could have ruled for the 
Hipwells: 
1. Earlier Delivery. 
Dr. DeVore testified that when Shelly went to the emergency room early on 
the morning of December 12, 1988, she was suffering from preeclampsia, that the 
standard of care required the emergency room physician to immediately have her treated 
by an obstetrician and that Shelly should have been delivered at that time. Dr. DeVore 
6
 It is noteworthy that Dr. Healy and IHC did not even attempt to obtain summary 
judgment on the basis that no reasonable jury could have determined that they were negligent in 
their treatment of Shelly, which is essentially what they are now arguing. 
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testified that had Shelly been delivered at that time the later severe complications she 
suffered would have been avoided. [See Appellants Brief, SOF Nos. 2 - 7]7 
Dr. Healy argues that Dr. DeVore did not diagnosis HELLP Syndrome or 
preeclampsia when he saw Shelly on December 13. Dr. Healy neglects to tell the court 
that all Dr. DeVore was asked to do at that time is to evaluate the fetus, which he did, and 
recommended that Shelly be immediately delivered. [R. 5004 at pp. 430-431] 
2. The Liver Rupture. 
Dr. DeVore testified that Shelly had elevated blood pressure, low platlats and 
spontaneous bleeding under the skin following delivery. At approximately 10:30 A.M. 
on the morning of December 14, 1988, Shelly had a hypotensive crisis involving 
plummeting blood pressure, rapid heart rate and other physical signs and symptoms 
indicating that she was in shock due to loss of blood. At that time, she was admitted to 
the McKay-Dee intensive care unit where her care was co-managed by Dr. Baughman, 
the Director of the ICU, and Dr. Healy. Shelly's abdomen was distended upon arrival at 
the ICU and continued to become more distended during the next seven hours there. Dr. 
Baughman recognized that internal bleeding was a likely cause of this distension. The 
7
 Dr. Healy tells the court that "Dr. DeVore did not himself use the definition of 
hypertension he was advancing and relying upon at trial." That claim is incorrect. In fact, Dr. 
DeVore testified that the definition of hypertension includes a blood pressure rise of either 30 on 
the systolic or 15 on the diastolic or 15 from baseline. [R. 5004 at pp. 329-333 and 407-412] Dr. 
DeVore testified that when Shelly arrived at the emergency room she had hypertension and 
protein in her urine thereby qualifying for a diagnosis of preeclampsia. She also had epigastric 
pain which meant that she had severe preeclampsia. [R. 5006 at pp, 810-812] 
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ICU called Dr. Healy and told him that Shelly was "crashing". In other words, Shelly 
was dying. Dr. DeVore testified that in his opinion Shelly's liver ruptured on the 
morning of December 14, which was the cause of the hypotensive crisis that occurred at 
that time. Dr. DeVore testified that Shelly's ruptured liver should have been repaired at 
that time. [Appellants' Brief, SOF No. 8; R. 5004 at pp. 470-474; 478-479; and 491-509] 
Dr. Healy once again criticizes Dr. DeVore's credentials on the basis that he 
has never operated on a liver and was not board certified in critical/intensive care or 
internal medicine. Judge Iwasaki correctly overruled the attempts of Dr. Healy and IHC 
to exclude Dr. DeVore's opinion of when the liver rupture occurred on these grounds. [R. 
5004 at pp. 474-477] 
3. The Transfer, 
Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman were concerned that Shelly would die and that 
her abdominal caesarean section wound may have been developing necrotizing fasciitis. 
The appropriate treatment for that condition was surgical removal of the tissue in the area 
of concern and antibiotics. On December 21, 1998, Dr. Alder conducted a surgical 
debridement of the tissue in the area of Shelly's abdominal wound and she was followed 
with antibiotics. Dr. Alder did not believe that Shelly had necrotizing fasciitis and so 
advised Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman. The McKay-Dee pathology report on the tissue 
removed by Dr. Alder indicated that Shelly did not have the lethal form of necrotizing 
fasciitis about which Dr. Baughman was allegedly concerned. Dr. Alder's followup 
examinations on December 22 and December 23, 1988, revealed that Shelly's abdominal 
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wound was "healthy appearing" and was improving. [Appellants' Brief, SOF Nos. 11 and 
12] Notwithstanding these facts, and the fact that the McKay-Dee ICU was capable of 
treating Shelly's critical illness, Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman had Shelly transferred, via 
helicopter, in a critically ill state and on a ventilator, to the University Hospital on 
December 23, 1988. [Appellants' Brief, SOF No. 13] 
Dr. DeVore testified there is no reason to transfer to Shelly to the University 
Hospital and that the transfer was a breach of the standard of care. [R. 5005 at pp. 584-
608 and 636-637] 
The Hipwells clearly met their burden of demonstrating harmful error. 
F. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR THE 
HIPWELLS5 CLAIMS AGAINST IHC, 
Finally, IHC makes the strained argument that despite the fact that the jury 
determined in the statute of limitations trial that the statute of limitations did not bar the 
Hipwells' claims against Dr. Healy or IHC, nevertheless the statute of limitations does 
bar the claims against IHC because the Hipwells did not prove in the statute of limitations 
trial that Dr. Healy was an agent of, or in privity with, IHC as required by this court's 
decision in Jensen. [IHC Brief, pp. 30-36] This argument is without any merit 
whatsoever. 
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In Jensen, this court held that Dr. Healy's fraudulent concealment of 
malpractice would not serve to toll the statute of limitations against IHC unless an agency 
or privity relationship existed between Dr. Healy and IHC. [944 P.2d at 338] 
After the remand in Jensen, this court decided Day v. Meek, 976 P.2d 1202 
(Utah 1999). In Day v. Meek, this court clarified that fraudulent concealment only comes 
into play after the four-year repose period provided by §78-14-4(1) of the Utah Medical 
Malpractice Act statute of limitations has expired. 
In Day, this court stated that the same analysis applied with respect to the 
applicability of the exceptions contained in §§ (a) [the foreign object exception] and (b) 
[the fraudulent concealment exception] of §78-14-4(1) within the 4-year period of repose. 
The court opined: 
The one-year limitation on cases involving fraudulent concealment 
makes sense only if it comes into play after the expiration of the 
four-year repose period, which would otherwise cut off all causes 
of action. 
Day concluded: 
In sum, we hold that Utah Code Ann., §78-14-4(l)(a), applies 
only to claims brought after the four-year repose period and does 
not negate or supplant the operation of the two-year general statute 
of limitations prior to expiration of the repose period. 
Because the Day court determined that the same analysis was applicable to §§ (b) 
fraudulent concealment cases, it is plain under Day that fraudulent concealment is only 
applicable to the statute of limitations after the expiration of the four-year repose period. 
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Relying on Day v. Meek. Dr. Healy and IHC filed below a joint motion for a 
special verdict form, specifically arguing that based on this court's ruling in Day, the 
fraudulent concealment exception no longer had any application to this case because 
"[t]his is clearly not a case where the four-year period lapsed." [R. 1919, 1926] A 
heading of a section of their memorandum in support of Defendants' Joint Motion for 
Approval of Special Verdict Form reads: 
THE VERY RECENT OPINION IN DAY v. MEEK CLARIFIES 
THAT THE FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT EXCEPTION TO 
§78-14-4 ONLY APPLIES TO CASES WHERE THE FOUR-
YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE HAS PASSED. [R. 1925] 
IHC and Dr. Healy further told Judge Iwasaki in their memorandum: 
In interpreting the scope of the foreign object exception, the 
Court expressly noted that it would necessarily also be deciding the 
scope of the parallel fraudulent concealment exception to 
§78-14-4. The Court concluded that the foreign body exception 
and the fraudulent concealment exception applied only after the 
four-year repose period has run. 
This is clearly not a case where the four-year period lapsed. 
The issue is when the plaintiffs, through their counsel, Simon 
Forgette, discovered the legal injury, thus commencing the two-
year statute of limitations. The fraudulent concealment exception 
has no application under the plain ruling in Day. [R. 1926] 
Dr. Healy and IHC accordingly requested that the special verdict form read: 
Would a reasonable attorney, presented with the facts that attorney 
Forgette knew [prior to] December 16, 1999 have considered 
investigating a medical malpractice case against Dr. Healy and 
McKay-Dee? 
Dr. Healy and IHC told the court: 
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If the jury answers ctyes"> judgment must be entered in favor of 
defendants. If the jury answers "no", the statute of limitations 
defense will have failed and the case will proceed to trial on the 
medical negligence claims. [R. 1926, 1927] [Emphasis Added] 
This special verdict question did not require the jury to determine agency or privity. 
The Hipwells agreed that the fraudulent concealment exception was no longer 
applicable to this case. [R. 2049] The Hipwells took the position that acts of concealment 
would be put in evidence not to prove fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of 
limitations but as simply part of the facts and circumstances that the jury would consider 
in determining when plaintiffs discovered, or should have discovered, their cause of 
action for medical negligence. [R. 2049] The Hipwells proposed the following special 
interrogatory which was adopted by Judge Iwasaki: 
Prior to December 16, 1989, did attorney Forgette discover or 
under the circumstances is it reasonable that he should have 
discovered the legal injury done to Shelly Hipwell by Dr. Healy 
and McKay-Dee Hospital. [R. 1981 and 2015] 
Judge Iwasaki used the verdict form proposed by the Hipwells. The jury 
found for the Hipwells. [R. 2423] The Defendants did not except to the verdict form, nor 
did the Defendants' subsequent Joint Motion for JNOV/New Trial argue that the verdict 
form should have contained language regarding Dr. Healy's agency or privity with IHC. 
[R. 2515-2561] 
Based upon Day v. Meek. Judge Iwasaki excluded any evidence of privity or 
agency from trial. [R. 2277-2279] And, Dr. Healy and IHC successfully moved to 
exclude any evidence of the fraudulent concealment. [R. 2278; R. 4997 at pp. 4-9] 
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IHC now contradicts its argument to Judge Iwasaki by insisting that Day did 
not rule that the statute of limitations exception is only relevant if the four-year statute of 
repose has expired. [IHC Brief, pp. 35-36] This argument not only contradicts IHC's 
argument in the district court which was conceded by the Hipwells and accepted by Judge 
Iwasaki as demonstrated above, but is also plainly wrong. 
IHC argues that Day only dealt with whether the one-year exception for 
discovery of foreign objects applied to a claim brought shortly after the expiration of that 
one-year period or whether the general two-year after discovery provision applied. The 
language of Day quoted above adequately disposes of this argument. IHC also argues 
that Jensen applied common law principles of fraudulent concealment to toll the general 
two-year provision and not fraudulent concealment under §78-14-4(l)(b). However, that 
statute does not contain any special definition of fraudulent concealment. The fraudulent 
concealment referred to in the statute is common law fraudulent concealment. The statute 
simply extends the statute of limitations if common law fraudulent concealment is 
proven. 
IHC claims that the law of the case doctrine applies to preclude the Hipwells 
from arguing that fraudulent concealment - - and thus the issues of privity and agency - -
is not necessary to toll the statute of limitations in this case after Day. IHC ignores the 
well recognized exception to the law of the case doctrine that the doctrine will generally 
not be enforced where there has been an intervening change of controlling authority. See. 
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e.g.. Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah. 31 P.3d 543, 546 (Utah 2001); Red 
Flame. Inc. v. Martinez. 996 P.2d 540, 542 (Utah 2000). 
After Day, the evidence of the coverup was only relevant insofar as the statute 
of limitations was concerned to the extent that the evidence bore on the issue of what 
Simon Forgette (and thus the Hipwells) knew, or should have known, concerning possible 
claims against Dr. Healy and IHC as of December 16,1989. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Judgment 
should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
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